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Abstract
The paper introduces the notion of a categorical pair, a pair of categories
(C,C ′) such that every morphism in C is an object in C ′. Arrows in C ′ can
express relationships between the morphisms of C. In particular we show
that by using a model of the linguistic process of naming, we can ensure that
morphisms F in C can have an indirect self-reference of the form a −→ Fa
where this arrow occurs in the category C ′. This result is shown to comple-
ment and clarify known fixed point theorems in logic and categories, and
is applied to Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem, the Cantor Diagonal Process
and the Lawvere Fixed Point Theorem.
Keywords: category; categorical pair; 2-category; indicative shift;
self-reference; indirect self reference.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a categorical pattern that com-
plements the Lawvere Fixed Point Theorem. We produce a construction
for indirect self-reference that applies directly both to situations in ordi-
nary language and to Go¨del’s Theorem on the incompleteness of formal
systems. Our construction can be summarized very succinctly and so we
begin the paper with a self-contained account of the construction, and then
devote the rest of the paper to discussion about how this indicative shift
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[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] can be seen in a number of different contexts.
The indicative shift is defined in Section 2. The shift formalizes an operation
on names that can also be regarded as an expansion of a name in the sense
that if “A” is the name of A then the expansion E“A” refers to A“A”, the
result of appending the contents of the name to the name. Thus if we regard
the name as pointing to its contents as in
“A” −→ A
then the expansion of the name points to the concatenation of the contents
with the name
E“A” −→ A“A”.
Self-reference results when one expands the name of the expansion operator.
E“E” −→ E“E”.
The arrow of reference occurs at a different level than the concatenations of
names and their contents. In this paper there will be two categories C and
C ′, where the morphisms in C ′ are arrows between morphisms in C.We refer
to C ′ as the second category or the higher category in the pair (C,C ′). The
arrows of reference are in the higher category C ′.
In the case of Go¨del’s Theorem, the pattern is similar. One has a method
to assign natural numbers (Go¨del numbers) to formulas. Letting g −→ F (u)
denote the assignment of the Go¨del number g to the formula F (u) with free
variable u, we let ♯g denote the Go¨del number that is assigned to F (g), the
formula obtained by evaluating F (u) at its own Go¨del number. Thus given
g −→ F (u),
we have
♯g −→ F (g).
Indirect self-reference is obtained by starting with a formula of the form
F (♯u). Then we have
g −→ F (♯u)
and
♯g −→ F (♯g),
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where g is the Go¨del number of F (♯u). The formula F (♯g) refers to its own
Go¨del number. This is the key indirect self-reference behind the Go¨del the-
orem which then proceeds to take F (u) = NB(u) where the formula NB(u)
asserts (within a formal system F) that there is no proof of the statement
with Go¨del number u. (NB is short for “nicht beweis”.) Using this method
of creating indirect self-reference we get
♯g −→ NB(♯g),
a statement that asserts its own unprovability in the formal system F . If the
formal system is consistent (and capable of handling these representations of
arithmetic), then the statement NB(♯g) is true, but unprovable in F .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we construct a categori-
cal context for the indicative shift by considering a pair of categories (C,C ′)
where every morphism in the first category is an object in the second category.
Arrows in the second category can be interpreted as references between ar-
rows in the first category. In this sense the second category of the categorical
pair defined Section 2 takes the place of a meta-language in a logical con-
text. We prove two basic results about self-reference in this section that we
call the First and Second Self-Reference Theorems. The First Self-Reference
Theorem gives conditions under which an indirect self-reference can occur.
The formality of the indicative shift is as follows. Suppose that a and F are
morphisms in C such that the composition Fa is defined. Suppose that
a −→ F
is an arrow in C ′. Then it is either given or constructed (First and Second
Self-Reference Theorems) that there is an morphism ♯ such that
♯a −→ Fa.
This is the indicative shift. It follows that if
g −→ F♯
then
♯g −→ F♯g,
producing the desired indirect self-reference.
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The Second Self-Reference Theorem assumes that the pair of categories
(C,C ′) is a 2-category, and that a can be composed with itself. We show
that the indicative shift with ♯a = aa follows naturally from the properties of
composition in a 2-category. We end Section 2 with an application of its ideas
to an example of Raymond Smullyan. Smullyan’s example is a miniature
version of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. In Section 3 we show how the
Self-Reference Theorems apply to Go¨del’s Theorem when that theorem is
seen as the production of a statement that asserts its own unprovability in a
given formal system. In Section 4 we discuss the relationship of these ideas
with the Lawvere Fixed Point Theorem, and we discuss how the Lawvere
Theorem relates to Go¨del’s Theorem via its analog with the Cantor diagonal
process. The difference between our categorical approach and that of the
Lawvere Theorem is that we formalize indirect self-reference.
In Section 5 we discuss how these category ideas and the indicative shift
apply to ordinary language. More work needs to be done in relating these
formalisms to ordinary language, for it is in ordinary language that the line
between the categories (between level and meta-level) is easily erased. Names
of names are still names in ordinary language, and in the language of cate-
gories, objects and morphisms can become interchangeable. From the math-
ematical side one can approximate the situation of language by using higher
categories or even reflexive categories (where ideally there is a 1-1 correspon-
dence between objects and morphisms) rather than the categorical pairs of
Section 2. We give an example of a reflexive category (in that every object
is a morphism) by taking the generating arrows and the objects to be the
arcs of an oriented knot diagram. Section 6 is an Epilogue that reviews and
discusses the ideas and results of the paper. The paper ends with Section 7,
a return to self-reference and a discussion of the nature of self-reference in
the use of the word I.
2. The Indicative Shift
The indicative shift defined in this section formalizes an operation on
names that can also be regarded as an expansion of a name in the sense that
if “A” is the name of A then the expansion E“A” refers to A“A”, the result
of appending the contents of the name to the name. Thus if we regard the
name as pointing to its contents as in
“A” −→ A
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then
E“A” −→ A“A”.
Self-reference results when one expands the name of the expansion operator.
E“E” −→ E“E”.
In those contexts where one thinks of expanding a name to its contents
it is convenient to use the symbol E for the shift operator. In this section
we shall adopt the symbol ♯ for the shift. When we use the symbol ♯ we are
thinking of the shift at the point where a name is given to a contents. At
that point, there is an initial pointing of the name to the contents before
the name is directly associated with the contents. Then a shift occurs where
the name is associated with the contents and the abstract name is associated
with the reference to these contents. These points of language are further
discussed in Section 5.
The reader should recall that a category [17] consists in a collection of
objects and a collection ofmorphisms. To each morphism f there is associated
an ordered pair of objects (A,B). We write f : A −→ B to denote the
morphism and call A the domain of f and B the codomain of f. Given
morphisms f : A −→ B and g : B −→ C, there is a morphism g ◦ f :
A −→ C, called the composition of f and g. Composition of morphisms is
associative. Every object A comes equipped with an identity morphism 1A
whose composition (with A in the role of domain or codomain) with another
morphism does not affect that morphism. This is the complete definition of
a category.
We take as given that in a category one can say whether two objects are
equal and whether two morphisms are equal. We wish to model situations
where equality is replaced by reference. We speak this way for motivation
and use the word reference as it is used in ordinary language where one may
say that the name of a person refers to that person, or that the title of a
paper refers to the text or to the contents of the paper. We wish to model
situations where one distinguishes between the morphisms of a given category
and certain patterns of reference that are seen among these morphisms at a
second level. An example that we shall consider later is the reference of a
Go¨del number to its corresponding decoded text.
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Let there be given a category C and suppose that the set of morphisms of
C are seen as the objects in another category C ′.We shall call the morphisms
in C ′ reference arrows for the morphisms of C, and we shall call the pair of
categories (C,C ′) a categorical pair. We make no further restrictions on
a categorical pair other than that there are two categories C,C ′ with the
morphisms in the first category forming the objects in the second category.
A categorical pair is not constrained to be a 2-category (definition given
below).
There is a notion of 2-category (and of higher categories) [15, 17]. A 2-
category is a categorical pair with extra structure. In the notation of our
reference arrows, the extra structure is as follows. One may have
α : a −→ b
and
β : d −→ e,
arrows in C ′ where ad and be are both legal compositions in the base category
C of the categorical pair. Then it is natural that there should be a referential
arrow
α ◦0 β : ad −→ be,
usually called horizontal composition of these arrows in C ′.
Along with horizontal composition we have vertical composition which
is simply the given composition of arrows in C ′. We can denote vertical
composition by ◦1. Thus if
α : a −→ b, γ : b −→ c
then
γ ◦1 α : a −→ c.
Now suppose that we have two possible vertical compositions
α : a −→ b, γ : b −→ c
β : d −→ e, δ : e −→ f
where ad, be and cf are each legal compositions in the base category C of
the categorical pair. Then it is natural to demand the compatibility
(α ◦0 β) ◦1 (γ ◦0 δ) = (γ ◦1 α) ◦0 (δ ◦1 β).
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A categorical pair (C,C ′) that satisfies this compatibility (called the inter-
change law) is called a 2-category.
In the discussion below we shall formulate three self-reference theorems,
one just using categorical pairs and the other two assuming that the cate-
gorical pair is a 2-category. For most applications the reader will only need
to assume given a categorical pair.
Consider a categorical pair (C,C ′). Let a and b be morphisms in C and
let a −→ b be a morphism in C ′ with domain a and codomain b. Remember
that while a and b are morphisms in the initial category C, they are objects
in the referential category C ′. We call this arrow a reference from a to b.
We assume that for every object X in C there is a morphism ♯X : X −→
X. Thus each object in C is indexed with a special morphism ♯X to itself that
need not be the identity morphism. Given an arbitrary morphism a in C we
then have the compositions a♯ and ♯a, morphisms obtained by composing
with ♯X where X is either the domain or codomain of a. In this way, we will
denote composition with ♯X without explicitly writing X.
We shall say that an arrow a −→ b in the category C ′ is a composable
reference if the composition ba is defined.
We assume that the special morphisms ♯X in C have the the following
property:
The Indicative Shift. If a −→ b is a composable reference arrow in C ′,
then there is an associated reference arrow ♯a −→ ba. Here ♯a and ba denote
the compositions of these morphisms in the initial category C.
A categorical pair with these properties is called a referential pair.
Remark. Note that since C ′ is a category whose objects are the morphisms
of C, then given any morphism a : A −→ B (A and B are objects in C), there
is an identity morphism a −→ a in C ′. Unless A = B in C, this arrow will
not be composable and so the shift will not apply to it. When A = B, then
we have a shift to ♯a −→ aa. Because we demand composability of reference
in order to have the indicative shift, not all morphisms in C ′ can be shifted.
If the base category C has only one object, or if all morphisms have the same
domain and codomain, then any reference arrow can be shifted. In many
7
examples, this simple circumstance is satisfied. Note also that we may have
a −→ b composable with
a : A −→ B
and
b : B −→ Z
so that the shift ♯a −→ ba exists, but no further shift is possible unless
Z = A.
First Self-Reference Theorem (SRT1). Let (C,C ′) be a referential pair.
Let F be any morphism in the category C, and assume that there is a com-
posable reference g −→ F♯ in the category C ′. Then there exists a morphism
h in C and a reference arrow in C ′ such that h −→ Fh.
Proof. We are given
g −→ F♯
in C ′. This means that the codomain X of g is the domain of F♯, and this
is the same as the domain of F, and that ♯ = ♯X . Then apply the indicative
shift and obtain:
♯g −→ F♯g.
Thus with h = ♯g, we have h −→ Fh. This completes the proof. //
Remark. We interpret an arrow of the form h −→ Fh as a model of an
expression Fh that is talking about (in the internal language of compositions
in C) its own “name” (which is the morphism h from the point of view of
the category C ′).
Remark. Note that, in the above proof, if F : X −→ X (i.e. if F was a
morphism from an object to itself) then we could take the identity morphism
in C ′ for F♯,
F♯ −→ F♯
since then F♯ would be composable with itself. Then the indicative shift
produces
♯F ♯ −→ F♯F♯
and we have a = ♯F ♯ with a −→ Fa.
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Remark. Suppose that g : X −→ X in C and that F : X −→ Y in C. Then
if we have g −→ F in C ′ then the indicative shift gives an infinite sequence
of morphisms:
♯g −→ Fg
♯♯g −→ Fg♯g
♯♯♯g −→ Fg♯g♯♯g
and continuing in this fashion in the pattern
♯ng −→ Fg♯g♯2g♯3g · · · g♯n−1g.
On the other hand, if g : Z −→ X where the object Z is distinct from X,
then we can be given that g −→ F and one shift to ♯g −→ Fg is possible.
But the sequence of shifts stops here since the composition of g with itself or
with ♯g is not given to exist. This is one of the reasons for formulating this
shift in categorical terms. The properties of the base category C determine
limits or lack of limits on the recursion of reference that is implicit in the
indicative shift.
Remark. For the next Theorem we will concentrate on references a −→ F
where the domain and codomain of a are identical, so that there is no limit
on the recursion of the shift. We call a morphism a in C a self morphism
if it has the form a : X −→ X. We can regard the referential arrows of the
category C ′ as generalizations (categorifications) of the equality of morphisms
in the base category C. If the referential arrows are themselves taken to be
equalities then the indicative shift would state that if a = b as self morphisms
in C, then ♯a = ab. In other words, in this degenerate form, we would have
♯a = aa for all self morphisms a in C.
The First Self-Reference Theorem would then correspond to the following
calculation. If
g = F♯
then
♯g = F♯g.
Hence
gg = Fgg.
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The reader will recognise that this is exactly the form of the proof of the
Church-Curry Fixed Point Theorem for Lambda Calculus [1]. See the Epi-
logue (Section 6 of this paper) for more discussion of this point. The Indica-
tive Shift generalizes the Church-Curry Fixed Point Theorem to a context
that encompasses indirect self-reference.
We formulate a second self-reference theorem that is close to the flavor
of the lambda calculus. We assume that the pair (C,C ′) is a referential pair
that is moreover a 2-category in which ♯ is defined in a particular way. For
a self morphism a in C we define
♯a = aa,
as the composition of a with itself. We call the 2-category a lambda pair if
this condition is met for each self morphism a.
Second Self-Reference Theorem (SRT2). Let (C,C ′) be a 2-category
that is a lambda pair as defined above with ♯a = aa for each self morphism
in C. Then, given a composable reference arrow a −→ F in C ′, there is a
corresponding morphism ♯a −→ Fa. With respect to this indicative shift we
obtain indirect self-reference from any composable reference a −→ F♯ by
taking the corresponding shift to ♯a −→ F♯a. Note that this morphism is the
same as aa −→ Faa. This final conclusion is a direct generalization of the
Church-Curry Fixed Point Theorem.
Proof. Suppose we have a morphism
a −→ F
in C ′. Let a −→ a be the identity morphism for a in C ′. Then we have the
horizontal composition of these two morphisms:
aa −→ Fa.
Note that the composition Fa exists since there is an arrow from a to F in
C ′. Hence we have, as desired, the shift morphism
♯a −→ Fa.
The rest of the Theorem follows in the same pattern as the proof of SRT1.
//
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The Smullyan Categorical Pair. An exercise related to Go¨del’s Theo-
rem due to Raymond Smullyan [18] can be naturally formulated in terms of
categorical pairs. In this case we only use the structure of categorical pairs.
We do not apply the indicative shift, but the Smullyan example contains its
own indirect self-reference. The first category C consists in (as morphisms)
all words in the alphabet {∼, P, R, [ , ]}. where a word is any ordered string
of these symbols. such words include the empty word which is the identity
morphism in this category. The category C has a single object. Composition
in C consists in concatenation of strings. The objects in the second category
C ′ consist in strings X in the alphabet {∼, P, R, [ , ]}. Thus every morphism
in C is an object in C ′. Other than the identity arrows, the following types
of arrow in C ′ are allowed, where X is an arbitrary string in that alphabet.
1. PX −→ P [X ]
2. ∼ PX −→∼ P [X ]
3. RX −→ P [XX ]
4. ∼ RX −→∼ P [XX ]
Of course, once we allow these arrows in C ′, we allow a host of possible
compositions such as the composition of PX −→ P [X ] and P [X ] −→ P [[X ]]
to form
PX −→ P [[X ]].
The reader will note that by substituting R for X in item 3. we obtain the
indirect self-reference
RR −→ P [RR].
By substituting ∼ R for X in item 4. we obtain the indirect self-reference.
∼ R ∼ R −→∼ P [∼ R ∼ R].
Smullyan has an amusing interpretation of this formalism. He tells the
story of a machine that prints strings from the category C (he does not use
categorical terminology, but we will describe it that way). Only the special
itemized arrows (above) in C ′ are interpreted as restrictions and descriptions
of the machine’s actions. For codomains of arrows in C ′, P [X ] means print-
ablity of X and ∼ P [X ]means unprintablity of X. The category C ′ contains
the semantics for the categorical pair, but it also contains many expressions
that are not interpreted semantically with regard to the machine’s actions.
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1. If the machine can print the string PX then it can print the string X .
In other words
PX −→ P [X ]
means that X is individually printable if the string PX is printable.
2. If the machine can print the string ∼ PX then the string X is not
printable (as an isolated string) by the machine. The string ∼ P [X ]
means that X (alone) is not printable.
∼ PX −→∼ P [X ].
3. The printing of the string RX means that XX is printable.
RX −→ P [XX ].
4. The printing of the string ∼ RX means that XX is not printable.
∼ RX −→∼ P [XX ].
Thus we can interpret the Smullyan Machine in terms of the category C ′ by
saying that certain special morphisms in C ′ are interpreted as statements
about printability. Each of the special string types (lets us call them inter-
pretable strings) {PX,∼ PX,RX,∼ RX} might be printable by the ma-
chine, and if printed, they each tell what the machine can further print. It
is given that whenever the machine prints one of these special strings then it
tells the truth. We deduce that the machine cannot print the string
∼ R ∼ R ,
for this string asserts its own unprintability. Thus, while the Smullyan Ma-
chine always tells the truth when it prints an interpretable string, there are
interpretable strings that are true but unprintable! This Smullyan categorical
pair is an intriguing miniature version of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem,
with printablity replacing provability.
A Simplest Example. Let C be a category with one object O, the identity
morphism 1O, and one other morphism ♯ : O −→ O. We can take the mor-
phisms in C to be the set of strings { , ♯, ♯♯, · · ·} including the empty string
identified as 1O. In C
′ we take as given the morphism
−→
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from the empty string to the empty string. Then the shift (represented by
♯) produces sequentially:
♯ −→ ,
♯♯ −→ ♯,
♯♯♯ −→ ♯♯♯.
Self-reference appears at the third departure from the empty string. After
that we have
♯n −→ ♯n(n−1)/2.
A Next Simplest Example. Let C be any category with one object O
and morphisms F other than the identity morphism 1O and the morphism
♯ : O −→ O representing the indicative shift.
In C ′ we have the identity morphism
X −→ X
for each morphism X in C. Then the shift produces
♯X −→ XX.
This pattern is analogous to the pattern of reference (by repetition) in the
Smullyan Machine. In particular we have the self-reference
♯♯ −→ ♯♯
not necessarily the same as the identity morphism in C ′ for ♯♯.
The Universal Building Machine. We can interpret the expansion op-
erator E described at the beginning of this section as a universal building
machine. Then “X” designates a blueprint for the construction of X. (Of
course here we indulge in a hierarchy of names. Really X is the name of an
actuality and “X” is the name of the blueprint for constructing this actuality.)
Then we have
E“X” −→ X“X”,
meaning that the universal builder E takes the blueprint “X” and produces
the actuality X appended to a copy of its blueprint. The higher categorical
morphism is a morphism between the composition of the building machine
and the blueprint and the composition of the actuality and its blueprint.
The universal building machine will build itself when supplied with its own
blueprint.
E“E” −→ E“E”.
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Remark. In the examples we have given so far, the category C can be
replaced with a monoid of strings under concatenation. In this C there are
many morphisms and only one object. Nevertheless, we have formulated the
results in this section to include categories C with more than one object
and the possibility of morphisms between distinct objects in C Certainly
in linguistic and other referential situations there are many examples where
a given entity has a multiplicity of references to it. This is modeled in a
more general category C by a morphism F such that there is a multiplicity
of morphisms a such that the the composition Fa is defined. Under these
circumstances the indicative shift still holds and we may obtain a multiplicity
of indirect self-references in the form ♯a −→ F♯a. An interesting source of
abstract categories to consider for examples is found by starting with any
directed graph G and making a category C whose objects are the nodes of G
and whose morphisms are generated by one identity morphism for each node,
one ♯ morphism for each node and all the edges in the graph are interpreted
as morphisms between their initial and final nodes. We allow multiple edges
and loops in the graph.
3. Go¨del’s Theorem
In order to discuss Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem from the point of
view of the indicative shift, we first start with the more general situation of a
formal language L that is susceptible to Go¨del numbering. The basic notions
of formal language and Go¨del numbering are explained in many books on
logic. The interested reader can consult [18, 19, 20, 21]. We will assume that
the formal language L has the capacity to make statements about natural
numbers involving a free variable x such as “The natural number x is greater
than 2.”. We will denote statements involving a single free variable x in
the form S(x). Such a statement gives rise to infinitely many specialized
statements that may be either true or false by substituting specific numbers
for x. Thus one could write
S(x) = “x > 2”
and
S(3) = “3 > 2.”
It is also understood that one can substitute the name or reference to a
specific number for x in a statement S(x). Thus, instead of the numeral 3,
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we could substitute for x the statement “ the first odd prime number” written
in the language of L (assuming that L is rich enough to express this notion).
Given a formal system, one can set up Go¨del numbering, a method that
associates a unique natural number to each formula or sequence of formulas
in L. We write g −→ S(x) to denote the Go¨del number g that is associated
with a formula S(x) with free variable x. At this point the arrow is just a
notation to indicate the association of the Go¨del number with its correspond-
ing formula. We assume that there is a well-defined notion for substituting
a Go¨del number g into a formula S(x) to obtain a new formula S(g). The
new formula no longer has a free variable. What is substituted has to be a
specific expression for the Go¨del number in the language L. Otherwise one
would obtain a collection of formulas S(h), one for each way to express the
number g. Once this choice has been made, then S(g) has a specific Go¨del
number. In particular, we can start with S(x), obtain its Go¨del number g
and then further obtain the Go¨del number h of the result of substituting g
into S(x). We shall let ♯g denote a formula in L that describes the process of
computing the Go¨del number of the result of substituting g into S(x). Thus
♯g is a formula that stands for (the computation of) the Go¨del number h.
We shall write
g −→ S(x)
and
♯g −→ S(g).
Note that in the second equation, we use ♯g rather than h on the left side
of the arrow. It is understood that ♯g stands for h. The reader should note
that while we use the arrow notation, no categories have yet been defined.
We continue the story of these substitutions. We can assume that the
formal system L is rich enough to express in its own language the operation
that takes the g to ♯g and that whenever one writes a formula of the form S(x)
one can also write the formula S(♯x). Here, as in the previous paragraph, ♯x
stands for a formula in L that describes the process of computing the Go¨del
number of the result of substituting the Go¨del number of S(x) into the free
variable in S(x). Under these circumstances, we have
g −→ S(♯x),
and
♯g −→ S(♯g).
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We need to distinguish clearly between Go¨del numbers and expressions in
the language L that refer to the construction of such numbers. We assume
that the Go¨del numbers are written in a standard numeral form like 3 and
not expressed indirectly as in “the smallest odd prime number”. The formula
S(♯g) refers to its own Go¨del number and hence achieves an indirect form of
self-reference. In this formula, g is a number written in the language L and
♯g is a formula in L that is applied to g. Thus the expression ♯g refers to the
Go¨del number of the formula S(♯g).
This background is a short description of how indirect self-reference is
accomplished in the context of proving Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
The rest of the well-known proof of the Incompleteness Theorem uses this
form of indirect self-reference applied to a statement S(x) = ∼ B(x) that
informally says “The statement whose Go¨del number is x has no proof in the
formal system L.” The making of such a statement within the formal system
L requires that L be sufficiently expressive so that it can internally encode
the notion of a proof. Once this is accomplished, one uses the construction
of indirect self reference as shown below.
g −→∼ B(♯x)
and
♯g −→∼ B(♯g).
The final statement ∼ B(♯g) asserts its own unprovability in L. If L is consis-
tent, one concludes, by reasoning that occurs outside L, that ∼ B(♯g) is not
provable within L. Thus ∼ B(♯g) is a statement that is true but unprovable
by L. If the formal system L is consistent, then it is incomplete. It has long
been assumed that known formal systems for elementary number theory are
consistent. Under this assumption, such systems are incomplete.
We now indicate the categories C and C ′ that will place Go¨del’s Theorem
in our context. A caution to the reader: These categories do not prove the
Incompleteness Theorem. The proof still depends upon the careful construc-
tion of a formal system L as described above. We obtain a description of how
the indirect self-reference in the structure of the Incompleteness Theorem can
be seen in a categorical framework.
Let the base category C have a single object, call it O. Generating mor-
phisms in C, other than the identity morphism and a special morphism ♯, are
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formulas in L that have less than or equal to one free variable and natural
numbers expressed outside the system L. The natural numbers outside the
system are candidates for Go¨del numbers and will be composed according
to those expressions inside L for which they are code numbers. A formula
without a free variable may or may not define a number (integer) in L. We
shall call a formula numerical if it designates an integer. It is assumed that
the language L has a special category of formulas that designate numbers
directly. These will be called numerals. For example one might use ||| as
the numeral for 3 in the formal system L. When a Go¨del number is substi-
tuted into a formula the number is translated to the corresponding numeral
in L. We will use usual decimal notation for numbers outside the formal sys-
tem. The coding method could depend upon the decimal system (as in the
example at the end of this section) or it could just depend upon number the-
oretic properties (such as the unique decomposition of a natural number into
prime factors). Let G and H be numerical formulas and let n and m denote
numerals in L. Let S(x) and T (y) denote formulas with one free variable.
Composition in C will primarily correspond to substituting one formula into
the free variable of another formula. We define (non-identity) compositions
in C as follows:
1. It is given that composition is associative.
2. S ◦T is a formal composition with no specified relation if S has no free
variable and S and T are formulas in L.
3. S(y) ◦ T (x) = S(T (x)) for S a formula with a free variable and T a
formula in L. Note that if T has a free variable, then so does S ◦ T.
4. S(x) ◦ n = S(n) whenever n is a numeral in L.
5. S(x) ◦ g = S([g]) whenever g is any natural number. Here [g] denotes
the numeral in L that corresponds to g.
6. If G andH are formulas that represent numbers, but are not themselves
numerals then G◦H is a formal composition with no specified relation.
7. If n and m are numerals in L, then n ◦m is a formal composition with
no specified relation.
8. If g and h are Go¨del numbers such that g is the Go¨del number of
a formula with one free variable S(x) and h is the Go¨del number of
a formula T , then g ◦ h is the Go¨del number of S([h]). Here we dis-
tinguish between Go¨del numbers outside the system L and numerical
expressions inside that system.
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9. If g is the Go¨del number of a formula with one free variable, then we
define ♯ ◦ g = ♯g as above. That is, if g is the Go¨del number of S(x),
then ♯g stands for the Go¨del number of S([g]). Otherwise we take ♯ ◦ g
formally with no specified relation.
10. If n is a numeral in L that stands for the Go¨del number g of a formula
with one free variable, then ♯n stands for ♯g expressed in L as [♯g].
It is understood that ♯n is an expression in L that refers to a specific
numeral in L.
11. ♯ ◦ S(x) is taken formally with no specified relation.
12. g ◦ ♯ is taken formally with no specified relation for any natural number
g.
13. T ◦ ♯ is taken formally with no specified relation for any formula T in
L.
14. S(x) ◦ ♯ is taken formally with no specified relation, but note that
(S(x)◦♯)◦g = S(x)◦(♯◦g) = S(x)◦(♯g) = S(♯g) when ♯g is numerical.
Similarly, (S(y) ◦ ♯) ◦ x = S(♯x).
This defines the category C. We then define admissible arrows in C ′ to
be the identity arrows and arrows of the form
g −→ F
where F is a formula in L with at most one free variable, and g is the Go¨del
number of F. If S is a formula in L that has no free variable and S represents
the Go¨del number g of F, then we also allow the morphism
S −→ F.
Compositions of morphisms in C ′ are formal with no specified relations other
than associativity. This completes the definition of the categorical pair cor-
responding to a given formal language L with Go¨del numbering. In this way,
the construction of indirect self-reference in Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theo-
rem can be regarded as an application of the First Self-Reference Theorem
(SRT1).
Remark. We can place Go¨del’s Theorem in the context of the Second Self-
Reference Theorem SRT2. Regard Go¨del numbers g as morphisms in a
category by defining g ◦ h, as above, to be the the result of substituting h in
the free variable of the decoding of g (if there is such a free variable). Then
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we see that ♯g = g ◦ g is a concise description of the ♯ operator as we have
defined it above. With this definition of composition of Go¨del numbers we
have a category C and can construct that category C ′ of arrows from Go¨del
numbers to texts in the formal system just as we did in the above paragraphs.
Now, if g −→ F where F is the decoding of g, then by definition gg = ♯g is
the Go¨del number of Fg where Fg denotes the result of substituting g into
the free variable in F. Thus we have gg −→ Fg as the horizontal composition
of g −→ F, and the identity arrow g −→ g and gg −→ Bgg as the horizontal
composition of g −→ B♯ and the identity arrow g −→ g.This gives exactly
the 2-categorical structure of the Second Self-Reference Theorem. The reader
should note that in the category C we have both Godel numbers and formulas
as morphisms. In the category C ′ we have identity morphisms that carry
numbers to numbers and formulas to formulas, but otherwise arrows in C ′
carry numbers or representatives of numbers to formulas.
In this way we see clearly that the categorification of the Church-Curry
Fixed Point Theorem that is implicit in the Second Self-Reference Theorem
applies to Go¨del’s Theorem, showing how the indirect self-reference central
to the Go¨del construction comes from changing an equality to an arrow.
Example. In this example we give a small formal language that has Go¨del
numbering and use it to illustrate our categorical constructions. Let L denote
a language with the following alphabet
A = {(, ),∼, P, x, |, ♯}.
The words in L are all possible strings of these symbols, and we will interpret
them in a way that is similar to the Smullyan Machine described in the
previous section. Accordingly, we let X denote any finite string of symbols
in this alphabet. We interpret x as a variable. We interpret | as the number 1,
|| as the number 2 and generally a string ||| · · · || with cardinality n vertical
slashes as the numeral n. The interpretation of ♯ will be explained below.
We will introduce Go¨del numbering and show how to produce a string that
refers to itself. If X is a Go¨del number of a statement in L, we will take
that statement to be the referent of X. We will interpret P (X) to assert
the printability of the referent of X and ∼ P (X) to assert the unprintability
of the referent of X. We will construct a statement that asserts its own
unprintability. Then we will point out how the categories C and C ′ are
constructed for the language L.
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The Go¨del numbers assigned to the individual members of the alphabet
are as follows.
1 −→ (
2 −→ )
3 −→∼
4 −→ P
5 −→ x
6 −→ |
7 −→ ♯
The Go¨del number assigned to a string of signs from the alphabet is the
ordered list of these corresponding digits, interpreted as a natural number in
the decimal system. Thus we have
34152 −→ ∼ P (x)
so that g = 34152 is the Go¨del number of ∼ P (x). If we wish to insert g
into the free variable in ∼ P (x), we must translate g into the language of
numbers in this formal system. This means that we replace 34152 by ||| · · · |
where there are thirty four thousand one hundred fifty two vertical slashes in
this numeral. We can write the abbreviation ∼ P (g), but in fact the actual
expression is very large indeed. Thus we have
34152 −→ ∼ P (x)
and
341666 · · ·62 −→ ∼ P (||| · · · |)
where there are 34152 slashes in the right hand side, and there are the same
number of 6’s in the Go¨del number on the left hand side. Thus 341666 · · ·62
is the Go¨del number of the formula obtained from ∼ P (x) by substituting
its own Go¨del number for the free variable x. In our previous terminology we
would write that, given g = 34152, we have ♯g = 341666 · · ·62 where there
are 34152 repeated 6’s in the second number.
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We can now explain the interpretation of ♯ in the formal system L. If a
formula contains ♯x for the variable x or ♯n for some numeral n, then ♯ is
interpreted as that function that assigns to one Go¨del number another Go¨del
number by decoding the first number and placing its Go¨del numeral in the
free variable of the decoded formula. If there is no such free variable, then no
action is taken and there is no interpretation of ♯||| · · · ||. In a full formal sys-
tem for number theory, ♯ would be an abbreviation for an algorithm written
in the language of that theory. Here we have only an external interpretation
for the meaning of ♯. In the situation of the full formal system one has both
the internal algorithm and the external interpretation, and one understands
that these two ways of looking at the process describe the same function.
Returning to our formula
♯34152 = 341666 · · ·62
where there are 34152 repeated 6’s in the second number, we note that one
can read the function ♯ directly in the decimal formalism. If the decimal
number n contains the digit 5 replace every occurrence of that digit by car-
dinality n consecutive 6’s. In this way ♯n is explictly described as a way
to insert the number n into itself by using two levels of coding the number
(decimal and slash/numeral). When we speak of ♯n we can think about it
as a direct function on decimal numbers, or we can understand it via its
definition through coding and decoding in relation to the formal system L.
We are now in a position to see directly the composition of Go¨del numbers
defined in this section for the category C. This category has one object and
each string in the formal system L is a morphism. Along with this, all natural
numbers in the decimal system are also morphisms in C. Note that it is given
that all natural numbers written in vertical slash numerals are morphisms in
C. We distinguish between slash numerals and decimal numerals. Here are
some examples of compositions of strings and numbers viewed as morphisms
in the category C.
1. Let n and m be any two decimal natural numbers. We define n ◦ m
to be the decimal number n obtained by substituting cardinality m
consecutive occurrences of the digit 6 in for every instance of the digit
5 in n. If n does not contain the digit 5 then no action is required for
the composition of n and m. For example 4152 ◦ 3 = 426661. Note that
4152 −→ P (x)
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and
426661 −→ P (|||).
Thus, if n and m are are Go¨del numbers of formulas A and B, and A
has a free variable x, then n ◦m is the Go¨del number of the result of
substituting B into the free variable in A. If n is the (decimal) Go¨del
number of A, then we have that ♯n = n ◦ n.
2. We have that 341752 −→ ∼ P (♯x) so that ♯341752 = 341766 · · ·62
with 341752 consecutive 6’s. Thus
341766 · · ·62 −→ ∼ P (♯||| · · · ||)
where there are 341752 consecutive vertical slashes in the expression
on the right. This expression, ∼ P (♯||| · · · ||) refers to its own Go¨del
number. Hence, if the formal system L tells the truth, then the formula
∼ P (♯||| · · · ||)
is not printable, since it says that it is unprintable. Since it is unprint-
able we find that it does tell the truth, and truth and printablity are
distinct for the system L.
4. Lawvere’s Fixed Point Theorem
This section is a brief discussion of Lawvere’s fixed point theorem. We
discuss how the Lawvere Theorem arises as a generalization of the the Cantor
diagonal argument, and we illustrate the Lawvere Theorem in the category of
sets. For the reader interested in seeing the full formulation of this Theorem
in cartesian closed categories, we refer him to [13, 14].
Lawvere’s Theorem [13, 14] is a direct generalization of Cantor’s diagonal
argument. Recall Cantor’s argument. We work in the category of sets.
Let [A,B] denote the collection of set theoretic mappings from A to B. Let
Z = {0, 1} and note that a subset A of a set X can be regarded as a mapping
A : X −→ Z where the elements of the subset are those x ∈ X such that
Ax = 1.
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Cantor. Cantor gave a proof that there is no surjective mapping from X
to [X,Z]. His proof goes as follows. Let F : X −→ [X,Z] be any mapping.
Define a subset C of X by the formula
Cx =∼ F (x)x
where it is understood that ∼ 0 = 1 and ∼ 1 = 0. C cannot be of the form
F (a) for any a ∈ X. For if C = F (a), then F (a)x =∼ F (x)x for all x ∈ X.
Hence F (a)a =∼ F (a)a. This is a contradiction since the negation ∼ has no
fixed points. From this Cantor concludes that for X infinite we have a higher
infinity for [X,Z] and so a hierarchy of infinities:
X < [X,Z] < [[X,Z], Z] < · · · .
Lawvere. Lawvere turns this scenario on its head by considering a more
general case where Z could be other than the set of two elements.
Lawvere’s Fixed Point Theorem for Sets. Let Z andX be sets. Suppose
that there exists a function
F : X −→ [X,Z]
that is surjective. Let
α : Z −→ Z
be any mapping from Z to itself. Then α has a fixed point.
Proof. Define C : X −→ Z by the formula
Cx = α(F (x)x).
Then by surjectivity of F, we have C = F (a) for some a and consequently
F (a)a = α(F (a)a).
Hence any mapping α : Z −→ Z must have a fixed point. //
Remark. Note that if we define a diagonal mapping
∆ : X −→ X ×X
by
∆(x) = (x, x),
23
then Cx = α(F (x)x) = α(eval((F × I)(∆(x)))) where I denotes the identity
map on X and eval(F (x), y) = F (x)y.Thus
C = α ◦ eval ◦ (F × I) ◦∆.
In this way the map constructed in Lawvere’s Theorem can be seen to work
in any category with products and a terminal object. The terminal object
serves to define the notion of a “point”. If A is an object in the category
and 1 is the terminal object, then a point in A is a morphism t : 1 −→ A.
Surjectivity of F : X −→ [X,Z] then means that for every g : X −→ Z
there is a t : 1 −→ X such that g = F ◦ t. The diagonal map is crucial to the
general construction. See [13] page 316 for a discussion of these points.
Lawvere’s Fixed Point Theorem can be used to place Cantor’s orginal
argument in different contexts. For example, let Z = {0, 1, J} where ∼ 0 =
1,∼ 1 = 0,∼ J = J. In this example we can interpret Z as the set of values
in Lukasiewicz three-valued logic [16]. Then generalized subsets of X are
described by maps into Z. In such a generalized set D : X −→ Z, elements
of x ∈ X are either definite members of D (D(x) = 1), definite non-members
of D (D(x) = 0), or indeterminate with respect to D (D(x) = J). If we
have a mapping F : X −→ [X,Z]. then we can define a new mapping by the
formula Cx =∼ F (x)x and we find that if C = F (z), then F (z)z =∼ F (z)z,
and we conclude that it must be the case that F (z)z = J.We cannot conclude
that C is not of the form F (z) for any z ∈ X. Thus Cantor’s argument about
higher cardinalities does not generalize to a set theory based on the three-
valued logic.
Return to Self-Reference Now return to our First Self-Reference Theo-
rem. In this context, for the Russell Set, Rx =∼ xx, we would generalize to
a reference arrow
R −→∼ ♯.
Applying the shift, we obtain
♯R −→∼ ♯R.
Instead of a contradiction, we obtain a referential arrow from the ♯R to its
negation. By changing equality to reference we have avoided the paradox.
This is exactly how such paradox is resolved in computer languages where
the referential step is often interpreted as a step in a recursive process. Of
course we do not assert that this recursion solves the paradox in its original
context.
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We end this section with a discussion of Go¨del’s Incompletness Theorem
in the Lawvere context and its relationship with our treatement of Go¨del in
the context of the First Self-Reference Theorem for categorical pairs.
Go¨del Revisited. Here is a how Go¨del’s Theorem is related to the Lawvere
Fixed Point Theorem. Let {φ(n, x)|n = 1, 2, 3, ...} denote a list of all syn-
tactically valid formulas involving a single variable x in the formal system
L (as described in Section 3). Suppose that L is strong enough to be able
(by proving or invalidating) to determine the truth or falsehood of each par-
ticular formula φ(n,m) for all natural numbers n and m. We define a new
formula by
Cx =∼ φ(x, x).
Assuming that the list of all formulas and the ability of the formal system
to determine their truth or falsity is complete, we then have Cx = φ(N, x)
for some natural number N. Thus we have
φ(N, x) =∼ φ(x, x)
for each natural number x and hence
φ(N,N) =∼ φ(N,N).
Since negation has no fixed point in the standard logic of L, we conclude
that any list that we make of statements for the system will be of necessity
incomplete with respect to the notion of truth within the system in terms
of provability. Provability within, and truth from outside the system are
distinct under the assumption that the system L is consistent.
When we describe Go¨del’s Theorem this way it is clear that it can be
seen as an application of the Lawvere Fixed Point Theorem. We simply take
F (x)y = φ(x, y) and the patterns match. Note that in this form of Go¨del’s
Theorem we did not encode directly a statement that asserts its own un-
provability. This approach to Go¨del via a diagonal argument sidesteps the
issue of self-reference. and instead shows the contradictory nature of com-
pleteness. This is the difference between the approach to Go¨del via the First
and Second Self-Reference Theorems and the Lawvere Fixed Point Theorem.
Using the Self-Reference Theorems we construct an abstract framework for
the Go¨del numbering and the indirect self-reference that is in back of the
incompleteness phenomenon, and we show that this phenomenon is directly
related to the higher categorical step of shifting from equality to arrow.
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5. Ordinary Language
In this section we consider an interpretation for the First Self-Reference
Theorem in terms of ordinary language. In this interpretation the morphisms
of category C are all texts in ordinary discourse and all referents for these
texts. Thus we regard perceptions and objects in the world as corresponding
to texts in a language that encompasses the written and spoken languages
that are commonly used. In this way, if I meet another person, that other
person would be regarded as a text whose name I come to learn in the course
of meeting him or her. Then if I meet person P (a text) and learn his or her
name N then at the beginning of that process there is indicated an arrow
from N to P.
N −→ P
but shortly thereafter, when the naming process is more complete, the text
that is P has become modified to contain its name in a prominent place and
the name has been shifted to indicate that it is a name of that person. In
actual practice this process is the one that includes our ability to recognise a
person P as that person with the name N. We indicate this shift of reference
by the indicative shift of Section 2.
♯N −→ PN.
In terms of our perception, a text P that has undergone this shift is now
known to have the name N. The name N appears in our representational
space along with the (text representing) the person P.
Thus we see that the notion of categorical pair and indicative shift is a
model of the referential shift inherent in the naming and referring of texts in
ordinary language and in language in a very general context.
The First Self-Reference Theorem then becomes a model for how self-
reference occurs in language. For we see that the simplest instance of the
Theorem is the act of naming the shift operation ♯.
M −→ ♯
Let M denote the name of the shift operation ♯. Then M is the name of
the linguistic ability to combine a name with the text to which that name
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refers. And we see that once that name of the shift is itself shifted, then a
self-reference occurs.
♯M −→ ♯M.
The completion of the naming process for the process of naming is self-
referential. When we refer to ourselves in language we refer to our own
ability to make and complete the act of naming.
Note how the rest of the First Self-Reference Theorem works in this con-
text. If we have a reference
G −→ F♯,
this is a reference to a text F♯ that talks about the naming process. Shifting
this reference we obtain
♯G −→ F♯G,
a naming of a text that discusses its own name.
We see that in the context of ordinary language a correct modeling must
be flexible enough to allow even more hierarchies of reference and, at the
same time to allow all these hierarchies to work at the same level since in
language the name of a name is still a name. We see therefore that the
splitting into two categories C and C ′ can lead to higher splittings (higher
categories) and if these categories are all to be seen at a level, one may need
to consider categories of infinite height where every object is a morphism and
every morphism is an object. We call such categories reflexive and hope that
they will be useful in an extension of this work to problems in mathematics,
linguistics and philosophy.
To clarify these last remarks, consider a sequence of categories
C C ′C ′′ · · ·C(n)C(n+1) · · ·
where the objects in C(n+1) are the morphisms in C(n). We shall say that
the category C(n) is of type n. There are a number of competing definitions
for the notion of n- category (recall our specific definition of 2-category in
Section 2). All n- categories are of type n. All the pair constructions in this
paper apply in the transition between C(n) and C(n+1). A reflexive category
is at level C∞ where any finite descent from morphism to object will reveal
only further morphisms.
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It might seem that a reflexive category would be a huge undertaking,
requiring some sort of limiting construction from a hierarchy of categories.
That this is not so is illustrated in Figure 1. Here we show, at the top of the
Figure, a morphism between two morphisms. If one were to draw a diagram
of morphisms such that every morphism of the diagram occurred between two
morphisms, then the diagram could be interpreted as describing a reflexive
category whose objects are the morphisms depicted in the diagram, and
whose morphisms are generated under composition by the morphisms shown
in the diagram (and the unwritten identity morphisms, one for each pictured
morphism). In this way, certain special diagrams can represent reflexive
categories.
In Figure 1 we depict such a diagram. We show a diagram T of a trefoil
knot and take the oriented arcs of that diagram to be morphisms in a cat-
egory that we shall call the Trefoil Category. Knot diagrams have just the
right properties, as described above, to generate reflexive categories. The
generating morphisms are the arcs in the diagram and we take the objects of
the category to also be this set of arcs. A morphism begins at one arc and
ends at another arc. Every morphism in this category is a morphism of mor-
phisms. Knot diagrams are of independent interest as they are formalizations
of projections of curves in three space and can be used to faithfully study the
topology of curve embeddings in three dimensional space. For this purpose
one usually takes the knot diagrams up to an equivalence relation generated
by the graphical moves shown in Figure 2 (the Reidemeister moves). It is not
our purpose here to dwell on the theory of knots, but in fact this association
of a category to a knot diagram can, in principle, be used to obtain topo-
logical information about the knot. We will treat this aspect in a separate
paper.
We also illustrate in Figure 1 a diagram T ′ that is not quite a knot
diagram that has the same formal characteristic of generating a reflexive
category. Each arc is seen to be an arrow originating on one of the arcs
and terminating on another. If the reader examines the Figure, it will be
apparent that we have a category with objects {A,B,C} and each of these
objects is a morphism with
1. A : C −→ B,
2. B : A −→ C,
3. C : B −→ A.
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Compositions of these morphisms are available, so this category has more
morphisms than it has objects, but it is certainly reflexive in that all its ob-
jects are morphisms. Reflexive categories of this sort can be associated with
knots and links. We shall study them in a separate paper. A second example
is shown in Figure 1 with the link diagram L. Here the associated reflexive
category has two objects A and B that are also generating morphisms for
the category. We have
1. A : B −→ B,
2. B : A −→ A.
The distinct morphism/objects A and B are “linked” categorically in that
each plays the role of a morphism for the other. It is clear that this notion of
linking is close to the way we speak of linking in ordinary language where a
linkage of plans, ideas or persons involves how each is a process for the other.
One reason for bringing in this example of a reflexive category in a section on
ordinary language is that we see that the Trefoil Category and the Link Cat-
egory (and indeed the diagrams as mathematical structures) arise from the
language of sketching of three dimensional forms. But also, when we translate
these diagrammatic forms into the corresponding reflexive categories we see
that the categories themselves contain patterns of mathematical/topological
languager. These are topics to be pursued elsewhere.
A
B
C
A
B
C
A B
T
L
T'
A
C B
Figure 1: Trefoil Category and Link Category
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Figure 2: Reidemeister Moves
6. Epilogue
Both the Self-Reference Theorems of this paper and the Lawvere Fixed
Point Theorem come from generalizing the Cantor diagonal process, and
both can also be seen as ways to generalize the Church-Curry Fixed Point
Theorem. In the Church-Curry Theorem we are given an algebra with a
binary operation that is not associative and an axiom of reflexivity that
states that functions of a single variable expressed in that algebra can be
named and regarded as elements of the algebra. Thus in such an algebra Λ
one might define G[x] = a((bx)x) as a function from the algebra to itself.
One is then guaranteed that there exists an element g such that for all x in
the algebra, gx = a((bx)x). This reflexive assumption of a correspondence
between elements of the algebra and mappings of the algebra to itself is very
strong.
The simplest instance of this strength is the Church-Curry Fixed Point
Theorem which states that every element F of Λ has a fixed point in the
sense that there is an a in the algebra such that Fa = a. The proof goes as
follows. Define G[x] = F (xx) for all x in Λ. Then, by the axiom of reflexivity
there exists g in Λ such that gx = F (xx) for all x. Letting x = g we obtain
gg = F (gg). So gg is the fixed point for F.
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At the formal level, the Lawvere Fixed Point Theorem can be seen as
a categorical generalization of the Λ algebra formalism C[x] = α(F (x)x)
where it is known that such a C must be represented algebraically by an
element of the form F (a) (the surjectivity hypothesis for F ). Then we have
F (a)x = α(F (x)x) and consequently F (a)a = α(F (a)a), giving α a fixed
point with a specific structure. The generality of the pattern allows it to
be applied to many situations beyond the original Cantor argument. The
application of the Fixed Point Theorem to Go¨del’s Theorem works best when
we do not think of Go¨del’s Theorem as depending on indirect self-reference.
The First and Second Self-Reference Theorems are generalizations of the
Church Curry Fixed Point Theorem where we replace equality signs by arrows
of reference and we correspondingly generalize the operator ♯x = xx to an
arrow of reference
♯x −→ xx.
We then generalize the fundamental repetition operator ♯ a notch further to
the indicative shift where, if
a −→ b
then
♯a −→ ba
and the Church-Curry Fixed Point Theorem is transformed into our First
Self-Reference Theorem. In fact we could take the initial category C to have
one object and its morphisms the elements of the lambda algebra having
either no free variable or a single free variable. Composition ab of morphisms
a and b is defined whenever a has a free variable. Then ab stands for the
substitution of b into the free variable in a. With this we have both the
indirect reference given by the First Self-Reference Theorem (and/or the
Second Self-Reference Theorem) and the fixed point results of the lambda
algebra available in the one categorical pair (C,C ′).
7. Self-Reference
Finally we return to self-reference in the form of the expansion of a name.
Recall the expansion operator as described in Section 1. We have an opera-
tion E on names that expands a name in the sense that if “A” is the name
of A then the expansion E“A” refers to A“A”, the result of appending the
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contents of the name to the name. Thus if we regard the name as pointing
to its contents as in
“A” −→ A
then
E“A” −→ A“A”.
Self-reference results when one expands the name of the expansion operator.
E“E” −→ E“E”.
How is this self-reference related to the self-reference we are all familiar with
in our personal experience?
To begin to see an answer to this question, consider the use of the pronoun
“I”. When I say I then I refer to myself. I alone does not refer to itself. It is
required that there be a contents related to the one who uses the word I. I
am the one who says I, and this can be said by anyone. So in a sense we can
say that I is really the expansion operator and the self-reference associated
with I occurs when we apply I to “I”, forming I“I” which is self-referent. In
other words, we each make a personal identification
I = I“I”,
that says “ I am the operation of expanding myself to my content (which is
myself).” This was said more eloquently by Heinz von Foerster [22] : “I am
the observed relation between myself and observing myself.” We encourage
the reader to expand further on these themes.
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